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The trust deficit in Sino-Japanese Relations 
Caroline ROSE and Jan SÝKORA 
ABSTRACT 
Recent years have seen a deterioration in political relations between China and Japan, in 
particular over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and history-related problems. 
Commentators have noted an attendant decline in trust between the two sides and have 
stressed the need for confidence-building measures in order to address the trust deficit. This 
article explores the origins of declining trust between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships. It 
argues that attempts to build a friendly and trusting relationship in the early post-war and 
post-normalisation periods began to fail in the 1980s, and have been in a gradual state of 
decline ever since. Using the concepts of trust and friendship, the article suggests that the 
lack of trust properties such as empathy, bonding, reliability and predictability have 
contributed to the deterioration of trust at both elite and popular levels.  
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__________ 
 
ÔTrust is like a sheet of paper. Once you crumple it, you can never smooth it perfectly.Õ 
(Czech proverb)  
 
World history provides much evidence of how trust can facilitate the complex trade linkage 
and stabilize political relations between various states and regions. Trust and good reputation 
were the cement of the coalitions of the Maghribi traders who operated in the Mediterranean 
during the eleventh century and faced the problems of asymmetric information and limited 
legal contract enforceability (Greif 1989, Greif 1993). Trust was the important instrument for 
solving the contractual problems in the business associations of Tokugawa merchants 
(kabunakama) and trust is thought of as the solid building block in searching for a path to the 
deep reconciliation between former enemy nations encumbered by the burden of the 
historical memory (He 2009: 2; Nadler and Saguy 2004: 37-42). Indeed, trust is the Ôglue that 
holds relationships togetherÕ (Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000: 86). 
Liberal theories of international relations are usually based on an assumption that building of 
free trade relations is one of the best and the least expensive ways towards peace between 
nations. The high level of economic interdependence, however, does not directly contribute 
to corresponding trust between the trading parties. Indeed, free trade is not the only sine qua 
non of peaceful coexistence, and there are many historical examples that demonstrate that to 
guarantee peace nations must trust each other and not simply trade with one another.
i
 The 
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problem of control over the territory along the French and German borderline, which had 
been a bone of contention between these two nations for more than a century is an apt 
example. Despite the bitter historical experience, the formation of the first European 
institutions in the late 1950s accelerated the process of trust building between France and 
Germany Ð both in the realm of formal diplomacy and on the civic level Ð and the idea of any 
potential military conflict in this part of Europe appears to be absolutely unthinkable (Gabusi 
2012).  
The situation in Sino-Japanese relations seems to be quite different. Despite more than forty 
years of formal diplomatic relations and intensive economic cooperation - China is the largest 
market for Japanese products and the most important supplier for Japanese industry - there is 
a considerable lack of trust between these two countries. The underlying distrust in Sino-
Japanese relations stems mainly from the unsolved historical issues which date back to 
nineteenth century (which revolve around different interpretations of the past and JapanÕs 
failure to accept full war responsibility), and has descended into a Ôvicious cycle of 
animosityÕ (Soeya 2013: 38), extending now to include concerns over security, not least the 
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (the dispute itself now having been incorporated into the 
history problem).  
In an attempt to quell the tension in Sino-Japanese relations linked to mounting difficulties 
over the territorial dispute between 2010 (when a Chinese fishing boat collided with a 
Japanese coast guard vessel) and 2012 (when the Japanese government nationalised some of 
the islands to head off Tokyo right-wing governor Ishihara ShintaroÕs attempts to purchase 
them), efforts have been made by both Chinese and Japanese governments since late 2014 to 
break the stand-off and return to some sort of normality. This was symbolised in particular 
with the hotly-anticipated and highly-publicised but ÔfrostyÕ meeting between Prime Minister 
Abe Shinzō and President Xi Jinping at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
meeting in November 2014. This meeting was preceded by the joint announcement of a Four 
Point Statement (see Liff 2014) which aimed to re-set the situation surrounding the territorial 
dispute. Since then, there has been a resumption of various high-level bilateral dialogues 
which had been postponed or cancelled during the stand-off, along with signals from the 
leadership on each side seeking to reconfirm, signal and reassure the other side of their 
respective, if still rather distant, positions.  
Accompanying the recent vicissitudes has been a fledgling academic, political and popular 
discourse on trust or, more accurately, distrust in Sino-Japanese relations. Commentators 
have noted the widening trust deficit in Sino-Japanese relations, opinion polls have indicated 
a precipitous decline in mutual feelings of closeness and trust, and politicians have called for 
the need to rebuild or deepen trust between the two sides. The concerns expressed over the 
decline of trust reflect the fact that for a number of years both before and after normalisation, 
opinion polls (on the Japanese side) evidenced positive impressions of China. Thus, the 
questions arise as to, firstly, what was the basis for apparent mutual trust in the early post-war 
period, and, secondly, why has it gone into decline? 
Some consider that the erosion of trust dates from relatively recent tensions in the 
relationship that emerged during the period of DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) government 
from 2009 to 2012 and that have continued with AbeÕs return to power in 2012. One Chinese 
academic assessment, for example, suggests that the rapid turnover of Japanese prime 
ministers, and the changes in foreign policy strategy during DPJ rule contributed significantly 
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to the undermining of a relationship of trust between China and Japan (Zheng 2012: 46-7), 
although this view ignores the fact that many in the DPJ, and in particular its first prime 
minister, Hatoyama Ichirō, were in favour of improved relations with China. Other academic 
analyses have observed more medium-term decline in relations stemming from the end of the 
Cold War and the ensuing structural changes in East Asia which in turn lead to a sharp 
deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the early 2000s (Atannasova-Cornelis 2011, Soeya 
2013).  
 
This article addresses the question of why, after a period marked broadly by amicable 
relations, or at least attempts by the leaderships to bring about amity from the 1950s to the 
1980s, the relationship began to deteriorate in the 1980s to the extent that the early efforts at 
trust-building have gradually been eroded. It does so by applying concepts of trust, trusting 
relationships, and friendship in international relations as a means of tracing, firstly, the trust-
building efforts during the early post-war period, and secondly, the deterioration of the 
political relationship since the 1980s.  The main argument is that both the Chinese and 
Japanese leaderships demonstrated a willingness and genuine interest in developing a trusting 
and friendly relationship in the aftermath of their bitter conflict.  This was achieved through 
numerous trust-building initiatives before normalisation in the 1950s, and then during the 
early period of normalisation from 1972 to the early 1980s. These went beyond rhetorical 
references to friendship (for example in speeches or treaties) to encompass formal agreements 
(for example, on trade and investment) and institutions (for example, parliamentary groups 
and friendship groups) which actively sought to operationalise economic, political and 
cultural interaction. However, despite these early attempts to rebuild trust on both sides, trust 
properties were not sufficiently embedded into the fabric of the relationship before being 
challenged by changes in domestic, regional and international politics from the early 1980s. 
The article, therefore, outlines the ways in which aspects of the relationship began to be 
eroded in the 1980s and 1990s as each side questioned or challenged earlier understandings 
of the status quo, in this case relating to Yasukuni Shrine and the territorial dispute. The 
gradual erosion of certain properties of trusting relations such as empathy/bonding or 
integrity/reliability has meant that intermittent attempts in the 1990s, the first decade of the 
2000s, and again since late 2014 to try to improve relations (for example through 
reassurances, new written and unwritten agreements and so on) have only proved to be 
temporary patches.   
 
The article first explores the concept of trust to determine how it might be applied to the case 
of Sino-Japanese relations. It augments the concept of trust with recent studies on friendship 
in international relations as a means of explaining the ways in which Chinese and Japanese 
leaders attempted to build a new relationship from the 1950s. After considering some key 
points which best demonstrate this period of fledgling trust-building, the article then turns its 
attention to the emergence of the history problem in the 1980s and the territorial dispute in 
the 1990s to show how trust between the two sides has gradually been eroded.  
 
Conceptualising Trust 
There is a direct link between trust and the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. 
However, how should we define trust in the realm of international relations? Currently, there 
is no single, generally accepted definition of trust. ÔTrust, but verify,Õ said the US president 
Ronald Reagan, when he welcomed his counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev at the Washington 
summit on December 8, 1987 (Hoffman 2009: 295; Watson 2012: 38). This Russian maxim 
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is used also by Andrew H. Kydd at the very beginning of his book on trust and mistrust in 
international relations. According to Kydd trust is Ôa belief that the other side is trustworthy, 
that is, willing to reciprocate cooperationÕ while mistrust is defined as Ôa belief that the other 
side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit oneÕs cooperationÕ (Kydd 2007: 3). Thus, trust 
plays a key role in co-operative relations between two actors, or two larger groups of actors, 
whose behaviour fundamentally affects each other. Kydd argues that the role of trust in 
international relations consists of four main aspects. First, cooperation between states always 
Ôrequires a certain degree of trustÕ, while the minimal level of the trust depends on various 
factors like relative power of the actors or the costs of potential conflict. Second, although 
conflict may arise even between trustworthy parties, in principle conflict is Ôa sign that one or 
both of the states are likely to be untrustworthyÕ. Third, the presence of the hegemon (leading 
actor) in multilateral settings can promote cooperation Ôonly if the hegemon is relatively 
trustworthyÕ, and four, if both sides are in principle trustworthy, they will be able to 
Ôeventually cooperate with each otherÕ (Kydd 2007: 5). Thus, in KyddÕs interpretation trust 
depends mainly on returning cooperation rather than on exploiting it, while mistrust Ôis a 
belief that the other side prefers exploiting oneÕs cooperation to returning itÕ (Kydd 2007: 6).  
Aaron M. Hoffman points out that theories which equate trust with the willingness to take 
risk stemming from the unpredictable behaviour of the counterpart do not provide a marked 
difference between trust and mistrust. Thus, he associates trust in international relations with 
Ôa willingness to take risks on the behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees 
will Òdo what is rightÓÕ (Hoffman 2002: 375). He summarizes several essential elements any 
concept of trust explicitly or implicitly includes. Trust is usually related to the above-
mentioned willingness to pass the fate of oneÕs own interests in the hands of others. Since the 
actor has no means by which to predict the intentions of others, he just has to rely on the 
belief that the counterpart will not cheat him. Trust is manifested by a trusting relationship, 
the intensity and the scope of which are not static and may vary depending on the broader 
context and external circumstances. Thus, both parties usually calculate the risk of the 
counterpartÕs mistrust becoming vulnerable to its action (Hoffman 2002: 376-379). A trusting 
relationship per se, however, is not necessarily based on trust stemming from shared values 
and norms, but rather on the ÔtangibleÕ advantages for both sides in certain contexts of time 
and space.  
Time itself is also an important element of trust, as Barnett and Adler explain:  
Trust does not develop overnight but rather is accomplished after a lifetime of 
common experiences and through sustained interactions and reciprocal 
exchanges, leaps of faith É, trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of actions 
and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude notwithstanding the 
uncertainty that accompanies social life (1998: 414, italics added). 
These conceptualisations of trust and mistrust are a useful lens through which to view the 
past and current state of Sino-Japanese relations, not least by considering the extent to which 
actors involved have been willing to expose their own interests in order to put aside the past 
and build a new forward-looking relationship enabling both sides to reduce the risk of 
conflicts.  
Identifying the presence or absence of trust properties is one means by which we can measure 
levels of trust and trust-building in Sino-Japanese relations. Booth and Wheeler suggest a set 
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of four linked attributes: Ôleap in the dark/uncertainty, empathy/bonding, 
dependence/vulnerability, and integrity/reliability (2008: 234-245). The leap in the 
dark/uncertainty attributes refer to the willingness to take a risk in decision-making despite a 
possible backlash (for example from domestic constituencies) and despite the uncertainty that 
those in whom trust is being placed will act in ways that may harm you in future (Booth and 
Wheeler 2008: 233). Empathy/bonding takes place when both sides try to internalise each 
otherÕs hopes and fears, and translate a level of empathy and sympathy into a Ôpolitical 
relationship characterised by positive feeling and the forging of a new collective identityÕ 
(Booth and Wheeler 2008: 238). A recognition that each side can hold different 
interpretations of the same situation is one ingredient of this set of properties (ibid: 237). 
Dependence and vulnerability refers to the need for each side to be prepared to accept 
vulnerability and risk betrayal (ibid: 241). Finally, integrity/reliability means that partners 
have the confidence that the other will do what is right and behave in a predictable manner 
over time, which in turn can help to develop common norms and values (ibid: 243-4). 
Similarly, Larson explains that trust-building requires consistent policies over time, a 
commitment to match words with actions, predictability and credibility (the belief that Ôwe 
can rely on a state to fulfil its commitment and promisesÕ (1997: 714). Costly signals and 
reassurance are means by which consistency can be demonstrated and trust reinforced. Costly 
signals can help to kick-start the process of mutual reassurance, while reassurance can take 
the form of concessions or conciliatory actions in order to persuade the other side of oneÕs 
willingness to cooperate. Such actions have greater impact if they are non-contingent on 
reciprocity, irrevocable, reiterated over time and sustained (Midford 2002: 2, and Larson 
1997). Reassurance can also be provided through written or unwritten agreements to which 
both sides are expected to adhere over time.  
Applied to Sino-Japanese relations, trust properties of predictability, reliability and empathy 
began to be actively nurtured in the early post-war period, and both sides demonstrated a 
willingness to reassure the other of their commitment to certain positions. In ChinaÕs case this 
was the decision to pursue friendship with Japan with a view to normalising diplomatic 
relations as soon as possible, and took the form of such policies as Ôbenevolent amnesiaÕ, 
peopleÕs diplomacy and friendship trade. Japan, for its part, sought to reassure China, and 
other Asian neighbours, of its pacifist stance by adopting an exclusively defense-oriented 
posture, separating politics and economics as a means of re-opening trade channels, entering 
into the alliance with US (thereby putting the Ôcap on the bottleÕ), and adhering to the peace 
constitution (Midford 2002: 28-30). While the sort of costly signals described by Kydd in 
relation to the ending of the Cold War, such as the dramatic gestures made by Gorbachev that 
helped to dispel Western mistrust (2006:6) may not have direct equivalence in Sino-Japanese 
relations, nonetheless it is possible to see evidence of attempts by both sides at certain times 
to signal benign intent. There is also much evidence of reassurance, for example in the form 
of a set of written agreements produced to mark key stages of the relationship (and respond to 
the vicissitudes of political problems, particularly since the 1990s), and referred to as Ôthe 
four basic/political documents.Õ  The 1972 Joint Statement, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship, the 1998	Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship 
and Cooperation for Peace and Development, and the 2006 Joint Statement on the 
Comprehensive Promotion of a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common 
Strategic Interests together represent the agreed principles of Sino-Japanese relations which 
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are regularly invoked by Japanese and Chinese politicians, particularly at times of tension. 
One might also add the Murayama Statement (1995) and Kono Statement (1993) since these 
also have considerable weight in providing Japanese reassurances to the Chinese side on 
aspects of the history problem.  Furthermore, unwritten and/or tacit agreements have played 
an important role - in either reassuring the other side of the continued commitment to said 
agreement, or in signalling a change in opinion, difference of interpretation, or indeed 
outright denial, as is the case with the recent wranglings over the Ôtacit agreementsÕ relating 
to the territorial dispute and Yasukuni Shrine visits (to be discussed below).  
It is also useful to consider the relationship between trust and friendship, not least given the 
frequency with which the leitmotif of Sino-Japanese friendship has been used in China-Japan 
discourse since the 1950s. Academic studies of international friendship are, relatively 
speaking, in their infancy, but offer some useful pointers to identify the ways in which China 
and Japan Ôprepared the groundÕ to try and rebuild relations based on mutual trust.  Oelsner 
offers a definition of international friendship as Ôboth a relational and dynamic process made 
up of regular manifestations of mutual trust, shared affinities, and cooperationÕ (2014: 148). 
Furthermore, it is a Ôcumulative process of speech acts and institutional facts representing 
signs of engagement in, and proofs of, friendshipÕ which work across elite and societal levels. 
The focus on the nature of speech acts and institutional facts is applicable to the case of 
China and Japan, where , through an accumulative process, both symbolic gestures and 
concrete, tangible policy initiatives Ôwork to enhance a reciprocal view of trustworthinessÕ 
(Oelsner 2014:148). But such accumulative processes do not necessarily guarantee success in 
the construction of friendship, and, in a manner similar to the deterioration of friendship in 
Sino-Japanese relations, OelsnerÕs study of Argentine-Brazilian relations demonstrates how 
divergences of policy and changes in regional structures can have a negative, thinning, 
impact on previously dense political bonds (ibid: 159).  
 
Finally, Oelsner and KoschutÕs typology of international friendships is of use in explaining 
the breakdown of trust in China-Japan relationships. They identify two types:  -  strategic (or 
ÔthinÕ) friendship and normative (ÔthickÕ) friendship. The former describes actors who:  
 
refer to each other as ÔfriendsÕ in political discourse and treaties without it 
necessarily resulting in a substantial long-term change of behavior or mutual 
perception among these actors. Such a ÔthinÕ or strategic type of friendship does 
not permanently alter an agentÕs behaviour since it is purely based on rational 
self-interest. It is an entirely instrumental, functional, and oftentimes 
asymmetrical form of friendship (Oelsner and Koschut 2014: 14) 
 
Normative or thick friendship, on the other hand, develops among actors Ôwho share high 
levels of ideational and emotional bonds that permit mutual identification and trustÕ (Oelsner 
and Koschut 2014: 14). A strategic friendship, as the authors are keen to stress, is not 
meaningless, but, rather, carries a low- or middle-order meaning whereby connections 
between social actors function Ôto convey and transport relevant information about the other 
actors so that a certain congruence of interests may be achievedÕ (Oelsner and Koschut 2014: 
13, italics added). Ultimately, strategic friends may Ôrely on each other and yet not trust each 
otherÕ, and because this type of friendship is Ôbased on the congruence of interests (reliance) 
and not on genuine trustÕ they can be unstable and temporary, particularly if and when 
interests no longer converge (Oelsner and Koschut 2014: 14).  
 
By combining the concepts and approaches relating to trust and friendship, the article will 
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argue that while in the early post-war period, there were genuine attempts to lay the ground 
for a trusting relationship based on a diplomacy of friendship and a convergence of interests, 
by the 1980s, the structural conditions had shifted to the extent that Sino-Japanese relations 
displayed elements more akin to a strategic friendship, which in turn helps to explain the 
ensuing trust deficit.  
 
Trust and mistrust in Sino-Japanese relations Ð from friendship to frostiness 
Japan and China are, without any doubt, the most powerful actors in East Asia. They account 
for nearly three-quarters of the region's economic activity and more than half of the region's 
military spending. Despite their deep economic ties and a doubling of their bilateral trade in 
the past ten years, their relationship is increasingly strained, with dangerous implications for 
the region of East Asia and the world at large. 
Historically, relations between Japan and China had a long tradition and were clearly 
structured, since Ôone country was always more prosperous and powerful than the otherÕ 
(Calder 2006: 129). Before the 19
th
 century it was mainly China who was dominant in the 
relation, while since the Meiji Restoration, in 1868, Japan was generally been preeminent. 
However, the prospect that China and Japan could both be strong and powerful and affluent 
at the same time came to fruition at the beginning of the 21
st
 century with China and Japan 
representing the second and third largest economies in the world respectively. Moreover, 
ChinaÕs military modernisation programme and the growth in its military budget has brought 
it up the rankings of military powers. Although Japan has a relatively low military profile, 
with its peace constitution and security alliance with the United States, it aspires to be more 
proactive in the face of growing perceived threats to its security. Thus, both China and Japan 
are simultaneously striving to carve out a strong position in the region. Such a trend has 
created new security threats on both sides Ð Japan watches Chinese ambitions with growing 
displeasure, while China expresses fears of the renewal of Japanese militarism. In both states 
nationalists who intentionally exploit the historical memories of World War II are gaining in 
popularity.  
Unfortunately, mutually beneficial economic dealings alone are not effectively soothing these 
tensions. In such a situation the best way to reduce the risk of conflict, and prevent hostilities 
that could last decades, would be to strengthen mutual trust. This was, in fact, the case in the 
early post-World War II period when China and Japan re-established links after their bitter 
conflict and for some time an emphasis on friendship prevailed. These positive sentiments 
were also reflected in the regular opinion polls conducted by JapanÕs cabinet office which 
showed that friendly sentiments towards China were very strong among the Japanese. In the 
1980s, the polls showed that more than 75 percent of Japanese had positive feelings about 
China. This started to change in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square massacre, and by 2005 
only 23 percent of respondents felt warmly towards China (Calder 2006). In the last decade 
this has deteriorated further with a record 93 percent of Japanese respondents and 86.8 
percent of Chinese respondents (this was a slight improvement on the previous yearÕs 90.1 
percent) reporting that they held a Ôbad impressionÕ of the other country (Genron NPO/China 
Daily 2014). While many opinion polls have tended to focus on questions relating to how 
close people feel or feelings of friendship, recent surveys have directly addressed the question 
of trust or trustworthiness. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun and XinhuaÕs Oriental Weekly 
ran a joint poll in 2009 which reflected rather low levels of trust by respondents on both sides. 
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In 2009, 69 percent of those polled in Japan felt that China was not trustworthy and 63 
percent of the Chinese respondents felt Japan was not trustworthy (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009). 
In an October 2010 survey (after the Senkaku/Diaoyu collision incident), 84 percent of the 
Japanese respondents did not trust China (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2010).  
 
Re-building trust after WWII 
In order to understand how trust has declined in Sino-Japanese relations since the late 1980s, 
we first need to understand how trust was built after WWII between the two former enemies. 
ChinaÕs civil war and JapanÕs period of occupation kept the two countries apart for the latter 
half of the 1940s, and the decision on the part of the United States to recognise the Republic 
of China over the PeopleÕs Republic of China in 1952 put further distance between the two 
countries.  
This distance was mitigated, however, by the determination of both governments to seek 
some means of informal contact, which developed in the 1950s through private trade 
agreements and, albeit limited, cultural exchange. Such contact was prone to disruption at 
times of domestic political problems in China (the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural 
Revolution), or when Japanese leaders took a pro-Taiwan position (for example, Prime 
Ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Sato Eisaku), but when the global and regional environment 
began to change in the early 1970s with NixonÕs decision to recognise the PRC, Japan and 
China were in a good position to normalise their relations quickly. 
There are several examples of ways in which both the Chinese and Japanese leaderships took 
steps to re-build trust between the two countries in the early post-war period, both through 
speech acts and through tangible policy initiatives (see, for example,  Soeya 1998 and Itoh 
2012), but this section will briefly discuss two aspects in particular which demonstrate some 
of the trust properties outlined above and the means by which the leadership on each side 
sought to reassure the other of their Ôbenign intentÕ: the period of ChinaÕs Ôbenevolent 
amnesiaÕ, and the negotiations in the run up to normalisation in 1972.  
ChinaÕs position of Ôbenevolent amnesiaÕ towards Japan from 1945 to 1982 emerged almost 
in the immediate aftermath of the war when the Guomindang (GMD) under Chiang Kai-shek 
and then the Communist party under Mao Zedong adopted a lenient approach to JapanÕs 
wartime atrocities. Indeed the long history of friendship between the two countries before 
1894 (the first Sino-Japanese War) was intoned to emphasise the need to put the (wartime) 
past in the past. The friendship discourse was important in attempting to re-connect the two 
countries through empathetic means. Premier Zhou Enlai explained to a delegation of 
Japanese Dietmembers in 1954: 
The history of the past sixty years of Sino-Japanese relations was not good. 
However, it is a thing of the past, and we must turn it into a thing of the past. This 
is because friendship exists between the peoples of China and Japan. Compared 
to the history of a few thousand years, the history of sixty years is not worth 
bringing up (cited in Reilly 2011:469). 
 
ChinaÕs benevolent approach could be seen in the leniency with which both the GMD (in 
1946-9) and the Communists (in 1956) conducted military tribunals of Japanese personnel 
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(see Kushner 2015, and Cathcart and Nash 2008), and in the general suppression of 
discussion of Japanese atrocities which continued into the 1970s. Friendship diplomacy was 
by no means a one-way street, nor did the Japanese seek to avoid issues relating to the war.  
For example, head of the Economic Planning Agency Takasaki Tatsunosuke offered his 
apologies to Zhou Enlai for JapanÕs actions during the war during a meeting at the Bandung 
Conference in 1955. ZhouÕs response Ð that both the Chinese and Japanese people suffered 
from the actions of Japanese militarists (Hattori 2015: 14-15) Ð reinforced the empathetic 
view that the Japanese people as a whole were not to be held responsible, but had themselves 
been victims of the war.  
This is not to ignore the role of strategic interests that were also at play during this period. In 
the 1950s China was keen to Ôbalance against the United States by seducing its ally to 
ChinaÕs sideÕ (Shirk 2007: 158; Hattori 2015: 14). While Japan was not ÔseducedÕ to ChinaÕs 
side, it nonetheless benefited from, and indeed actively sought, to keep links with China open, 
not simply for commercial purposes (which was of limited worth in the 1950s and 1960s 
anyway), but as an early engagement strategy (Drifte 2003:14). Thus, both sides were keen to 
secure tangible advantages according to the prevailing structural conditions.  
Zhou Enlai and Mao ZedongÕs position of ÔgenerosityÕ from the 1950s remained intact in the 
1970s as demonstrated in the negotiations in the run up to the signing of the 1972 Joint 
Statement which were marked by a distinct lack of lengthy discussion on issues that have 
since become highly contentious Ð the wording of the apology, reparations, and territorial 
issues. The nature of the discussions can also be seen to have been informed by strategic 
factors Ð with other realpolitik-related issues at the forefront, such as the emphasis on anti-
hegemony clause in the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty with China seeking to balance 
against the Soviet Union (Reilly 2011: 469), but the transcripts of the talks leading up to 
normalisation provide evidence, on both sides, of a willingness to make concessions and 
provide reassurances in the interest of securing the peace. On the Chinese side, for example, 
Zhou Enlai agreed that the joint declaration would avoid mention of the Japan-US Security 
Treaty (which China had opposed), and that China would not seek hegemony. On the 
Japanese side, Tanaka offered reassurances that Japanese militarism would not be revived, 
and the two sides liaised on the wording of an appropriate apology (see Ishii et al 2003). 
The role of individuals as well as the structure of decision making in China is important here 
too ÐMao, Zhou and later Deng Xiaoping had an Ôunchallenged authorityÕ (Shirk 2007: 158) 
by virtue of their nationalist credentials, and all were firmly in control of foreign policy 
decisions. They were relatively unencumbered by factional politics or the need to secure their 
own legitimacy and credibility as would be the case with the next generation of leaders. The 
relationship also benefited from strong bonds between individual Chinese and Japanese pro-
friendship politicians, diplomats and business leaders, which in turn helped in the 
development of predictable and trustworthy relations. The 1972 Joint Statement and the 1978 
Peace and Friendship Treaty set the tone and discourse for the paradigm of friendship 
diplomacy for the next decade, marked by goodwill and mutual cooperation (Watanabe 2015). 
ChinaÕs ÔgenerousÕ approach was reciprocated by JapanÕs Ôcooperative and conciliatory 
policy,Õ which enabled it to pursue its interests in commercial relations, while taking an 
accommodative posture regarding the history issue, and avoiding security competition with 
China (Mochizuki 2007: 746-8). In this way, both sides recognised and accommodated each 
otherÕs interests. 
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Sowing the seeds of mistrust: 1982 to 1989 
After a brief Ôhoneymoon periodÕ that accompanied diplomatic normalisation and the 
resumption of formal trading relations (see He 2009), the vulnerability of the previous trust-
building attempts began to be revealed as domestic and international changes took place. By 
the early to mid-1980s, tensions over the content of Japanese history textbooks and the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue emerged and tested the strength of Sino-Japanese trust and friendship. 
The diplomatic tension between China and Japan which erupted during the summer of 1982 
over the alleged 'beautification' of history in Japanese high school textbooks was resolved 
fairly quickly with the Japanese concession to insert a clause in the textbook guidelines 
urging authors to pay attention to the feelings of neighbouring countries (Rose 1998). 
However, this turned out to be a temporary fix, since the roots of the problem Ð the 
diametrically opposed interpretations of the war in China and Japan which began to emerge 
after a revision of Communist party history in the early 1980s, and the ongoing domestic 
struggles in Japan between the progressive and conservative views of the war Ð were not 
addressed. As a result, the textbook issue has continued to pose intermittent problems 
between China and Japan ever since, re-surfacing when right-wing textbooks are authorized, 
or when the Japanese Ministry of Education revises the curriculum guidelines.
ii
 
!
The relationship was tested again in 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid an 
official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August, and the situation deteriorated further when 
student-led anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in cities across China in September 
(Weiss 2014). In fact this was not the first visit to the shrine that Nakasone had made during 
his time in office, but it became a flashpoint in the bilateral relationship because he attended 
in his official capacity as prime minister. Furthermore, this was the first official visit of a 
Japanese prime minister since the souls of Class A, B and C war criminals had been 
enshrined at Yasukuni in 1978. Aware of the potential response from the Chinese government, 
Nakasone had dispatched Noda Takeshi, member of the Japan-China Society to China in July 
to try and seek ChinaÕs understanding. The Chinese leadership, via Sun Pinghua, head of the 
China-Japan Friendship Association clearly indicated, however, that it could not agree with 
such a visit because of the presence of the souls of the Class A war criminals (Hattori 2015: 
57).   
 
The anti-Japanese protests that later followed NakasoneÕs Yasukuni Shrine visit were 
ostensibly aimed at JapanÕs Ôsecond economic invasionÕ, that is the influx of Japanese 
products which symbolized JapanÕs economic power, while also being directed at the Chinese 
government. Kokubun argues, however, that the root of the problem lay in the lack of mutual 
trust between the two sides (2013:162). This is reflected in Zhao ZiyangÕs comments, made at 
the opening ceremony of the Japan-China Friendship Committee for the Twenty-First 
Century on October 15 1982, Ôthat Japan should do more things to benefit the two countriesÕ 
friendship and strive to avoid things that hurt the peopleÕs feelings and obstruct mutual trustÕ 
(Weiss 2014: 96, emphasis added). 
 
The demonstrations certainly showed that the friendship espoused by the Chinese leadership 
in the previous decades had not trickled down to the Chinese public, who instead were 
becoming suspicious of JapanÕs economic ambitions in China. Weiss suggests that 
NakasoneÕs actions as a whole (for example, his wish to strengthen the US-Japan alliance) 
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also had a deeper significance in that he Ôchallenged the status quo on more than the issue of 
Yasukuni.Õ  Specifically, the Chinese saw his actions as upsetting the Ôpattern of compromise 
and conciliationÕ that had characterized the relationship since normalization (Weiss 2014: 85). 
Nonetheless, Nakasone worked hard to try and put the relationship back on a stable footing. 
He agreed to Chinese requests to refrain from future visits in his capacity as prime minister, 
in the interests of Sino-Japanese friendship in general, but in particular to avoid undermining 
his friend and pro-Japan CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang (Zakowski 2011:6). However, 
the fact that Hu Yaobang was later ousted from power was a clear signal that the Chinese 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping was moving away from the pro-friendship strategy, and that 
the previous position on putting the past in the past had changed.       
 
NakasoneÕs decision to refrain from further official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine held firm 
(whether this was based on a tacit agreement or not is discussed below), and could be seen as 
an example of a costly signal given the potential audience costs for Nakasone in taking a u-
turn on the issue of prime ministerial visits to the shrine. Furthermore, the decision was 
upheld by subsequent prime ministers - with the exception of Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Ryūtarō who made a visit in 1996 (on the occasion of his birthday). Thus, a new status quo 
(on the Yasukuni Shrine) was established and remained in place until Koizumi Junichirō 
came to power in 2001 (Griffith 2014). However, the history-related problems that came to 
the fore in the 1980s, and the actions/reactions of both governments were a sign of things to 
come. The foundations of trust began to be undermined before they had been fully 
established.  
 
1990s /2000s: the trust gap widens 
Changes at the international and regional level in the 1990s impacted upon Sino-Japanese 
relations, as both countries sought to recalibrate their positions in the post-Cold War 
environment. Domestically both countries were undergoing significant political and 
economic transitions too. ChinaÕs rapid economic growth, military modernisation and the 
relatively smooth political succession from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin by the late 1990s 
contrasted with JapanÕs economic problems and a period of political change with the 
(temporary) ousting of the LDP in 1993 and the advent of coalition governments.   
JapanÕs changing security identity in the 1990s, from pacifism to active internationalism was 
accompanied by a conscientious attempt by the elite to tackle the Ôperpetual trust gap in East 
AsiaÕ (Soeya 2013: 39).  This was reflected in a series of statements relating to JapanÕs past 
aggression, and expressions of remorse and apology by various (LDP and non-LDP) prime 
ministers, efforts which were made Ôpublicly and officially, despite the well-known 
opposition or even antagonism from conservative forces in Japanese society and politicsÕ 
(Soeya 2013:39; also Midford 2002). For Soeya these efforts represented an Ôequilibrium 
point in postwar JapanÕs relationship to its pastÕ (2013:40). Yet, while individual attempts to 
address the past were generally welcomed in China (the Murayama statement in particular), 
the reiteration of statements and apologies did not have a cumulative effect of providing 
reassurance or building trust. Progressive voices in Japan on the history problem were being 
drowned out by a revisionist trend backed by members of the LDP, and attempts to reconcile 
the past through compensation cases were rejected in Japanese courts. In China, Deng 
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XiaopingÕs attempts to restore socialist spiritual civilisation (and reinforce the legitimacy of 
the Chinese Communist Party) later developed into Jiang ZeminÕs patriotic education 
campaign, which, though not an anti-Japanese movement per se, nonetheless had the effect of 
shining a bright light on JapanÕs brutal role in ChinaÕs century of humiliation.  
In general then, the 1990s saw a gradual deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations amidst rising 
threat debates on both sides. In the security sphere, ChinaÕs nuclear tests, tensions in the 
Taiwan Strait, and Chinese concerns about the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance 
contributed to the uncertain environment. To exacerbate matters further, changes in the 
structure of Sino-Japanese relations meant that the pro-friendship constituencies on both sides 
were becoming less influential  Ð this included friendship groups, China/Japan experts, the 
ÔChina schoolÕ in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pro-Japan or pro-China 
parliamentary groups or factions, the business lobby and trusted individuals and so on.   
This overall negative shift in relations was perhaps exemplified in Jiang ZeminÕs visit to 
Tokyo in 1998 and the subsequent signing of the Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership 
of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development. JiangÕs visit, originally scheduled 
for earlier in the year, was postponed until November due to the floods in China. The timing 
was perhaps unfortunate since it followed hot on the heels of a successful visit by President 
Kim Dae-jung who managed to secure a written apology from Prime Minister Obuchi in 
return for a pledge to put history in the past. Jiang hoped to secure a similar arrangement, and 
put the history problem at the top of the agenda. Unfortunately, his dogged handling of the 
issue, seen as an attempt to play the history card, Ôaroused Chinese public opinion, and, in 
turn, virtually unified the Japanese people against the Chinese presidentÕ (Rozman 2002: 111).  
Thus, unlike the agreements reached in 1972 and 1978, the 1998 Joint Declaration, despite its 
cheery title and promises of a new era of Sino-Japanese cooperation, stemmed more from an 
atmosphere of animosity and suspicion than friendship and trust. In an attempt to repair the 
relationship after JiangÕs visit, China initiated Ôsmile diplomacyÕ in 1999, and friendship 
returned as a key theme in Chinese media coverage of Japan until the turn of the century 
(Rozman 2002: 113-123).  
If we accept SoeyaÕs argument that the 1990s marked a point of equilibrium in JapanÕs 
relationship to its past, this was to change in the first decade of the 2000s when the rise of 
conservative forces challenged the Ôinternationalist interpretation and handling of historyÕ 
(2013:39). The period of KoizumiÕs leadership (2001-2006) is seen as a turning point. While 
economic relations between China and Japan boomed during this period, diplomatic tensions 
increased over a number of issues including the perennial problem of right-wing Japanese 
history textbooks, and JapanÕs pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
KoizumiÕs persistent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, however, were the main problem, and 
Ôbecame a symbol and even a litmus test for China and South Korea over JapanÕs attitude 
toward the pastÕ (Soeya 2013: 39). In 2005 the Chinese accused Koizumi of having 
abandoned a ÔgentlemanÕs agreementÕ between Tokyo and Beijing, agreed in 1985 after 
NakasoneÕs visit, to the effect that China would condone visits by officials other than the 
prime minister, foreign minister and chief cabinet secretary.  Koizumi flatly denied the 
existence of the agreement. By the second decade of the 2000s, security and sovereignty 
issues had returned to the fore in the shape of the territorial dispute. In this case too, 
squabbles over the nature, or very existence, of a tacit agreement contributed to the tension, 
and called into question the level of trust between the two sides.  
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Broken promises and cheap talk: tacit agreements on the Yasukuni Shrine and 
Senkaku/Diaoyu issues and the breakdown of trust. 
Tacit agreements (anmoku no ryōkai in Japanese) or gentlemanÕs agreements (junzi xieding in 
Chinese) on the shelving of the territorial dispute and on Yasukuni Shrine visits can be seen 
as examples of secret (or perhaps semi-secret) reassurances.  Yarhi-Milo describes these as 
private diplomacy or secret agreements among adversaries undertaken Ôwithout the 
knowledge or consent of the public or other members of the governmentÕ when leaders face 
significant domestic opposition (Yarhi-Milo 2013: 2-3). While the agreements discussed here 
are not between adversaries as such, they were nonetheless negotiated at times of particular 
tension in the relationship when public costly signals were perhaps not appropriate or 
possible. In contrast to the emphasis in the trust literature on Ôpublic commitments as costly 
signals that help foster cooperationÕ and where private diplomatic assurances might be seen 
as costless signals or cheap talk, Yarhi-Milo  argues that secret agreements have the benefit 
of avoiding lengthy bureaucratic process and domestic and/or international pressure, and  
Ôenables leaders to manage audiencesÕ expectations until they are convinced of the 
adversaryÕs sincerity and willingness to cooperateÕ (Milo 2013: 3, emphasis added).  
 
Yasukuni Shrine Ôagreement(s)Õ 
KoizumiÕs apparent abandonment of an informal agreement made by Deng Xiaoping and 
then Foreign Minister Abe Shintarō in the wake of Nakasone YasuhiroÕs official visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine became a bone of contention in 2005 (Shirk 2007: 163).
iii
 The claim that 
such an agreement had been reached was made public by Chinese Ambassador Wang Yi in 
2005, after KoizumiÕs fifth visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The claim was refuted by Koizumi 
himself, and indeed by Nakasone (Japan Times April 29, 2005; Hattori 2015:73-4).
iv
 Wang 
YiÕs attempts to rekindle the alleged agreement with Japan in 2005 fell on deaf ears. Indeed, 
by making the existence of such an agreement public and demanding that Koizumi stop 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, Ôthe Chinese government made it impossible for Koizumi to 
acquiesce without looking weak to his own domestic audienceÕ (Shirk 2007: 163).  
 
In fact, KoizumiÕs trustworthiness was already in doubt as far as the Chinese leadership were 
concerned after his second visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in spring 2002. This visit took place a 
few months after KoizumiÕs symbolic trip to China in October 2001 when he issued an 
apology (along the lines of the 1995 Murayama statement), visited the Marco Polo Bridge 
and the nearby Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese 
Aggression in Beijing. These actions had the effect at the time of reassuring the Chinese 
leadership that Koizumi could be trusted not to make a return visit to Yasukuni Shrine. When 
Koizumi made the sudden visit, Shirk suggests that President Jiang Zemin Ôappeared to feel 
betrayedÕ, hinting that ÔKoizumi had promised not to go to the shrine againÕ (2007: 169). 
Griffith also indicates that ÔJiang believed that there was a junzi xieding, or a gentlemenÕs 
agreement, between the two leaders that the shrine visit would not be repeatedÕ and that he 
did not expect a second visit (2013: 16).  
 
As Booth and Wheeler point out Ôto trust to any degree is always to risk betrayalÕ (2008: 242). 
Integrity plays a part too, implying that in taking the risk to trust, Ôpartners have confidence 
that the other will do what is rightÕ (ibid: 243). The ÔrightÕ action, however, is highly 
subjective, or ÔslipperyÕ in Booth and WheelerÕs terminology. The Chinese clearly saw 
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KoizumiÕs actions as a betrayal, and were particularly surprised by his visit because they 
were in stark contrast to his behavior and actions in the preceding month when he had praised 
ChinaÕs economic development at the Boao forum, and had even hinted at the possibility of a 
non-religious memorial in place of Yasukuni (Kokubun et al 2013: 208). KoizumiÕs 
ÔbetrayalÕ on an individual level is also of note here. Not only are Japanese prime ministerial 
visits to the Yasukuni proscribed by the Chinese because they Ôhurt the feelings of the 
Chinese peopleÕ, in this instance Koizumi also allegedly broke a promise to his counterpart 
thus undermining his credibility and integrity further - he did not live up to his words (as 
interpreted by Jiang). As a result, there were no further summit meetings during KoizumiÕs 
time in office.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Koizumi, or the Japanese government, continued to send mixed messages as far as the 
Chinese leadership was concerned. Hu Jintao urged the Japanese government to Ômatch 
words with deedsÕ in April 2005 at a meeting with Koizumi on the sidelines of the Asian-
Africa Summit in Bandung. While welcoming KoizumiÕs apology to the Conference the 
previous day for the suffering caused by the Japanese during World War II, HuÕs reference 
was to the fact that members of KoizumiÕs cabinet had visited the Yasukuni Shrine to mark 
the spring festival on the very same day (BBC, April 23, 2005).  
 
According to Shirk, Wang Yi hoped to do better with KoizumiÕs likely successor, Abe Shinzō, 
despite AbeÕs more nationalist credentials and his Yasukuni Shrine visit as Chief Cabinet 
Secretary in April 2006. In fact, Beijing appeared willing to accept AbeÕs ambiguous 
response to Hu JintaoÕs question about the Yasukuni Shrine, made during his visit to China in 
October 2006 soon after taking office. Abe said that he would not be drawn on whether or not 
he had visited the Yasukuni Shrine, or whether or not he would visit the Shrine.  Kokubun et 
al. infer that AbeÕs decision to make China his first overseas visit (it would normally by the 
US), and ChinaÕs willingness to accept a visit with such ambiguity remaining on the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue represented a big gamble for both governments, and indeed a 
Ôdangerous gambleÕ for Abe given his need for domestic support (2013: 224).  
These costly signals, given the potential for domestic opposition and backlashes in both cases, 
proved to be the sort of concessions needed to put Sino-Japanese relations back on a more 
stable footing after the nadir of the Koizumi period. They led to the agreement in 2006 to 
ÔupgradeÕ Sino-Japanese relations to a mutually beneficial strategic cooperation, 
demonstrating the positive (or Ôleap in the darkÕ) effect that a change in leadership can 
sometimes bring about in China-Japan relations.
v
  As part of this agreement, China made 
concessions relating to the joint development of the gas fields in the East China Sea, while 
Abe Ôneeded only to abstain from Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in an 
ambiguous ÒdonÕt ask, donÕt tellÓ fashion that avoided politicising the issueÕ (Pugliese 2014: 
53). During his one year in office Abe managed to build on his initial conciliatory stance, 
which was further consolidated when Fukuda Yasuo became prime minister a year later. 
AbeÕs energetic return to power in December 2012 also saw a return of the Yasukuni Shrine 
issue to the Sino-Japanese diplomatic agenda. He made a visit to the shrine the following 
December, amidst a generally poor atmosphere in Sino-Japanese relations stemming from the 
flare-up of the territorial dispute. Needless to say, his visit contributed to the ongoing 
difficulties in the relationship and precluded a summit meeting until the situation was eased 
in 2014.   
16	
	
The Senkaku/Diaoyu agreements 
The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands to which Japan, China and Taiwan lay claim, 
has caused intermittent problems since the early 1970s (see Wiegand 2009), but has benefited 
in the main from a tacit agreement made in the 1970s to shelve the issue. This had the effect 
of establishing a status quo where Japan maintained administrative control over the islands 
but refrained from making any Ôclear display of state sovereigntyÕ (OÕShea 2013: 198). 
The decisions to leave aside discussions about the territorial dispute were made during the 
negotiations for the Joint Statement in 1972 and reiterated during the talks in the lead up to 
the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. The tacit understanding enabled 
both treaties to be signed (the latter after some delay) while leaving the door open for Ôfuture 
generationsÕ to deal with the issue, as Deng Xiaoping announced at a press conference in 
October 1978 (Drifte 2014).  
The flare-up of the territorial dispute in 2010 and 2012 was exacerbated by actions and 
reactions, and claims and counter-claims on both sides about the existence of this 
understanding, and, furthermore, about the very existence of the territorial dispute itself. 
DengÕs formula that Ôsovereignty remains ours, shelve disputes, pursue joint developmentÕ 
(Fravel 2013) had started to shift in the 1990s as the strategic environment changed and 
China had embarked on its military modernisation programme. Japan had begun to deny that 
there had been a shelving agreement, and even that a territorial dispute existed at all in the 
early 1990s in response to ChinaÕs promulgation of its law on territorial waters in 1992, 
which included reference to the Diaoyu islands (Drifte, 2014). Unlike the Yasukuni Shrine 
agreement of 1985, however, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the gentlemanÕs 
agreement did exist (Pugliese 2014: 46-47). JapanÕs particularly vociferous assertions in 2010 
that there had been no shelving agreement (and that there was no territorial dispute), in 
addition to the detention of the captain of the Chinese fishing trawler after the collision 
(calling into question the Ôcatch and returnÕ agreement), were of particular concern to China, 
since they seemed to signal a change in approach (Drifte 2014). The events of 2012 and 2013, 
sparked by JapanÕs nationalisation of some of the islands (itself a pragmatic response by the 
Noda government to try and prevent a deterioration of the relationship had Ishihara Shintarō 
managed to purchase the islands), took the dispute to a new low with record numbers of 
Chinese vessels appearing in the waters surrounding the islands, and ChinaÕs announcement 
of an Air Defence Identification Zone (including airspace over the islands). The tension over 
the islands resulted not only in violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in cities across China, 
but a war of words played out by China and Japan in the international media, a situation far 
from Ôconducive to re-establish[ing] trust and good relationsÕ (Drifte 2014).   
In the absence of established conflict-prevention or even conflict-reducing mechanisms in 
Sino-Japanese relations, efforts to rebuild trust have gradually been taking place since 2013 
through some of the ÔtraditionalÕ pipelines of Sino-Japanese informal diplomacy, such as 
friendship groups, the business lobby, and a new generation of ÔtrustedÕ individuals including 
former Japanese prime ministers (Fukuda Yasuo, Murayama Tomiichi), and high-ranking 
Chinese officials with Japan-friendly inclinations (for example Hu YaobangÕs son Hu Deping) 
(Rose 2015). By late 2014, this Ôquiet diplomacyÕ resulted in a face-saving compromise 
solution for Xi and Abe. China was seeking recognition by Tokyo that a territorial dispute 
exists, and Ôan assurance that Prime Minister Abe would not make another visit to the 
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Yasukuni ShrineÕ (Pugliese 2014: 94). The resulting statements on the improvement of Sino-
Japanese relations issued in parallel in November 2014, with slightly different wording in 
Chinese, Japanese and English, offered a way out of the impasse, but can only be seen as a  
very tentative step towards rebuilding trust.  
While there is little evidence of costly signals to bring about a reconciliation in the recent 
China-Japan stand-off, efforts at reassurance through tacit agreements seem to continue. 
Pugliese argues, for example, that Fukuda Yasuo and AbeÕs National Security Advisor Yachi 
Shōtarō (the architect of the 2006 agreement on the mutually beneficial strategic relationship) 
were able to reassure their counterparts that Abe would not visit Yasukuni Ôpossibly until the 
last days of his mandateÕ, in return for a concession from the Chinese that they would make a 
Ôpublic appreciation of JapanÕs post-war path as a pacifist stateÕ (Pugliese 2014: 94). On the 
question of the territorial dispute, there was even less movement, and perhaps even greater 
(intended?) ambiguity than hitherto. While the Japanese statement refers to Ôdifferent views 
as to the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, 
including those around the Senkaku IslandsÕ, the Chinese statement notes that Ôthe two sides 
have acknowledged that different positions existÉ regarding the tensions Éover the Diaoyu 
Islands and some waters in the East China SeaÕ. Thus JapanÕs statement emphasises tensions 
in waters, not around islands, and neither side refers to sovereignty (Liff 2014: 4). While the 
statements might be seen as Ômasterpiece of diplomatic finesseÕ (Pugliese 2014: 94), they 
represent another temporary stop-gap in a seemingly intractable problem.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated how, in the early post-war period in Sino-Japanese relations, up 
to and including normalisation in 1972 and the few honeymoon years after the signing of the 
1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the leadership on both sides invested considerably in 
trust-building initiatives. They did this through a variety of means including reassurances, 
costly signals, and tacit agreements which helped to demonstrate empathy, integrity and 
reliability. They also took steps to institutionalise such initiatives through formal economic 
agreements and political and cultural exchanges.  However, this began to unravel in the 1980s 
suggesting that the roots of trust were shallow, and not able to take full hold. In fact,	far from 
developing a Ôreservoir of trustÕ in an Ôenvironment of certitudeÕ (Barnett and Adler 1998: 
414), trust in Sino-Japanese relations appears instead to have deteriorated gradually since the 
1980s. This is not to suggest a completely linear progression, however, and there have been 
frequent attempts to improve the relationship after periods of tension as evidenced by the 
issuing of the 1998 and 2006 statements. Indeed, the case of China-Japan relations clearly 
illustrates OelsnerÕs point that trust, like friendship, Ôadvances, reverses, fluctuates, expands 
and contractsÕ (2014: 159).  
Nonetheless, the status quo on sensitive issues such as Yasukuni Shrine visits and the 
territorial dispute that had been achieved/agreed upon (albeit tacitly) in the late 1970s/early 
1980s has been seriously undermined in the last two decades as both sides respond to changes 
in the strategic, economic and political environments.  Recent efforts may go some way to 
restoring relations, but this will require a sustained and long-term commitment, and will need 
more than rhetorical devices and ambiguous words to achieve substantive results. During a 
meeting in Beijing in June 2015 with Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, Deputy Prime Minister Aso 
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Taro called for the strengthening of mutual trust and offered reassurance that Prime Minister 
Abe is no different to other Japanese prime ministers in his stance on reflecting on the war 
(Japan Times June 6, 2015). This reassurance was tested with AbeÕs hotly-anticipated 
statement to mark the 70
th
 anniversary of the end of World War II, which ultimately fell short 
of Chinese hopes for a clear statement of JapanÕs militarist aggression and a direct apology 
(Gustafsson 2015).	
The goodwill and cooperation which characterised the honeymoon of the immediate pre- and 
post-normalisation period did not manage to survive the changes in domestic, regional and 
international environments since the 1980s, and the friendship structures in Sino-Japanese 
relations which had the potential to nurture mutual trust and cooperation have weakened 
rather than strengthened over time. As the article argues, a number of factors explain the 
growing trust deficit. In particular,  attributes such as  empathy and bonding, predictability 
and reliability have weakened. The empathy/bonding that characterised the early post-war 
period, marked by amicable relations between the leaders and their attempts to re-build 
friendly relations were not able to be sustained for long enough to become embedded at inter-
societal level. This is, of course, partly attributable to the fact that apart from activities 
organised by friendship and cultural groups, there were very few opportunities for Chinese 
and Japanese people to meet until after ChinaÕs opening up and reform period began. Even 
though opinion polls in the 1980s recorded (JapanÕs) highest levels of positive feelings 
towards China, these dropped in the late 1980s and never really recovered. Starting from the 
1980s, the predictability and reliability of actions and reactions started to falter, along with a 
divergence in how each side interpreted the past. This was itself precipitated by domestic 
change in each case (leadership succession, and a re-casting of Communist Party history in 
China on the one hand, and a renewal of progressive versus conservative clashes of history 
consciousness in Japan on the other).  
 
In this way, Sino-Japanese friendship as informally constructed from the 1950s, and formally 
constituted through treaties in 1972 and 1978 corresponds more to Oelsner and KoschutÕs 
conceptualization of ÔthinÕ or strategic friendship, rather than ÔthickÕ or normative friendship. 
Strategic interests on both sides converged during this period, and produced an emphasis on 
friendship, not only discursively but also institutionally. The long-term aim may well have 
been to encourage  mutually positive perceptions and shared interests, but, once the domestic 
and international strategic environments began to change in the late 1970s/early 1980s,  Sino-
Japanese friendship diplomacy  began to falter. This is not to deny a genuine interest in, and 
ongoing commitment to, rebuilding Sino-Japanese relations on the part of leaders, politicians, 
business and civil groups at the time. But for the strategic relationship to have developed into 
a ÔthickÕ friendship enjoying shared norms and values, trust needed to be nurtured and 
sustained over a longer period of time, at both leadership and societal levels.  
 
In an essay published in Asahi Shinbun in 2012, Murakami Haruki argued that the Sino-
Japanese relationship is affected by some kind of national madness. Murakami likened both 
countries to two people who get drunk on cheap sake: 
When territorial issues cease to be a matter of reality and move to the realm of 
Ônationalist sentimentÕ, it creates a dangerous situation from which there is no 
way out. It is like cheap alcohol. Cheap alcohol gets you drunk after only a few 
shots and makes you mad. It makes you speak loudly and act rudelyÉ But after 
your drunken rampage you are left with nothing but an awful headache next 
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morning. We must be careful about politicians and polemists who lavish us with 
the cheap alcohol and fan this kind of rampage.  
It is true, that effective diplomacy is based on a rational trust-building process rather than on 
the demonstration of national emotions, but neither China nor Japan currently seem to be 
prepared to bear the political costs of trust building.  
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